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Abstract—Accurate state estimation is of paramount impor-
tance to maintain the power system operating in a secure
and efficient state. The recently identified coordinated data
injection attacks to meter measurements can bypass the current
security system and introduce errors to the state estimates. The
conventional wisdom to mitigate such attacks is by securing meter
measurements to evade malicious injections. In this paper, we
provide a novel alternative to defend against false-data injection
attacks using covert power network topological information. By
keeping the exact reactance of a set of transmission lines from
attackers, no false data injection attack can be launched to
compromise any set of state variables. We first investigate from
the attackers’ perspective the necessary condition to perform
injection attack. Based on the arguments, we characterize the
optimal protection problem, which protects the state variables
with minimum cost, as a well-studied Steiner tree problem in
a graph. Besides, we also propose a mixed defending strategy
that jointly considers the use of covert topological information
and secure meter measurements when either method alone is
costly or unable to achieve the protection objective. A mixed
integer linear programming (MILP) formulation is introduced to
obtain the optimal mixed defending strategy. To tackle the NP-
hardness of the problem, a tree pruning-based heuristic is further
presented to produce an approximate solution in polynomial
time. The advantageous performance of the proposed defending
mechanisms is verified in IEEE standard power system testcases.
Index Terms—False-data injection attack, power system state
estimation, smart grid security, graph algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations and summary of contributions
STATE estimation is a major component in the EnergyManagement System (EMS) of electrical power grids. The
state estimator receives the raw meter measurements fed by the
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system,
filters the incorrect data and derives the optimal estimate of
the power system operating states [1]. The state estimates will
then be passed on to the other EMS application functions
such as the contingency analysis and optimal power flow, to
control and optimize the system performance. Accurate state
estimation is critical to maintain the system to operate in a
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secure and efficient state. However, the integrity of state esti-
mation is under mounting threat as we gradually transform the
current electricity infrastructures to future smart power grids.
The system is more open to the outside networks from the
extensive use of internet-based protocols in the communication
system. In particular, enterprise networks and even individual
users are allowed to connect to the power network information
infrastructure to facilitate data sharing [2]. With these entry
points introduced to the power system, potential complex and
collaborating malicious attacks are brought in as well. Liu et
al. [3] showed that a false-data injection attack that alters a
subset of selected meter measurements could circumvent bad
data detection (BDD) in today’s SCADA system and introduce
arbitrary errors to state estimates without being detected.
Essentially, the altered meter measurements are structured
to be consistent with the physical power flow constraints.
Such an attack is referred to as an undetectable false-data
injection attack and has attracted increasing research interest in
the power system cyber-security [4]–[6]. A recent experiment
in [7] demonstrates that the attack can cause a state-of-the-
art EMS/SCADA state estimator to produce a bias of more
than 50% of the nominal value without triggering the BDD
alarm. Biased estimates could directly lead to serious social
and economical consequences. For instance, [8]–[10] showed
that attackers equipped with data injection can manipulate the
electricity price in power market. Worse still, [11] warned that
the attack can even cause regional blackout.
The conventional wisdom to mitigate false-data injection
attack is by securing meter measurements to evade malicious
injections, e.g. either by guards, video monitoring or tamper-
proof communication system, etc [4], [12]–[15]. For instance,
[12] quantifies the vulnerability of meter measurements in
the presence of injection attack using “security indices”. [13]
computes the critical points in the measurement set, the
compromise of which would result in successful undetectable
attack. [4] proposed to use phasor measurement units (PMUs),
which provide direct voltage phasor angle measurements at
the buses installed, to mitigate sparse undetectable attack. In
particular, [15] proved that it is necessary and sufficient to
protect a set of basic measurements so that no undetectable
false-data injection attack can be launched, where the size
of a set of basic measurements is the same as the number
of unknown state variables in the state estimation problem.
With a limited budget but the vast size of large-scale power
networks, it is often not possible to completely eliminate
the chance of undetectable attack. In practice, the system
operator should first protect the state variables that have greater
social/economic impact once compromised, such as those
2for critical buses/substations connected to heavily loaded or
economically important areas, or with critical interconnection
purposes [16]. Our preliminary study in [17] has partly ad-
dressed this issue, where a sequential method is proposed to
find a minimum set of meter measurements for the protection
of any set of state variables. However, the enumeration-based
method is of very high computational complexity in large scale
power systems. It is therefore meaningful to devise an efficient
method to protect a subset of state variables that serves our
best interests, and opens to the possibility of expanding the
set of protected state variables in the future.
Another newly emerged approach against injection attack is
to limit the attacker’s knowledge of the topological information
needed for performing attacks [18], [19]. In practice, this
incurs lower operation cost as it merely needs to change the
parameters of some software/hardware configurations, such as
the adjustable transformer taps in transmission lines, or the
flexible a.c. transmission systems (FACTS) to adjust the real-
time effective reactance, etc [20], [21]. It was shown in [18]
that the intentional topology perturbation enables the system
operator to detect the presence of false-data injection using
conventional residual test. However, a random topology pertur-
bation does not fully eliminate the possibility of undetectable
attack. For instance, [22] showed that undetectable attack is
still possible if the attacker has imperfect but structured topo-
logical information. Currently, it lacks of a systematic study
that provides an explicit guideline for the system operator to
efficiently utilize the covert topological information against
injection attacks.
In this paper, we focus on using covert topological informa-
tion (CTI) to mitigate false-data injection attacks. By keeping
the exact reactance of a minimum set of transmission lines
from attackers, no undetectable injection attack can be formu-
lated to compromise any set of state variables. Besides, we
also propose a mixed defending strategy that jointly considers
CTI and conventional secure meter measurement methods. Our
detailed contributions are listed as follows,
• We derive from the attackers’ perspective a necessary and
sufficient condition to perform undetectable attack with
partial topological information. In particular, we develop
a min-cut method to design the optimal attack, which
requires the minimum knowledge of system topology.
The result is useful to develop effective countermeasures
against undetectable attack.
• We show that the solution to the optimal state variable
protection, which defends a set of critical state variables
with minimum CTI, can be obtained by solving a stan-
dard Steiner tree problem. Although the problem is NP-
hard, many well-investigated exact and approximation
algorithms can be directly applied.
• We also develop a mixed defending strategy that jointly
considers the use of CTI and secure meter measure-
ments when either method alone is costly or unable to
achieve the protection objective. A mixed integer linear
programming (MILP) formulation is introduced to obtain
the optimal mixed defending strategy. To tackle the NP-
hardness of the problem, a tree pruning-based heuristic
is further presented to produce an approximate solution
in polynomial time.
B. Related works
State estimation protection is closely related to the concept
of power network observability. The conventional power net-
work observability analysis studies whether a unique estimate
of all unknown state variables can be determined from the
measurements [1]. From the attacker’s perspective, [15] proved
that an undetectable attack can be formulated if removing the
measurements it compromises will make the power system
unobservable. Conversely, [23] showed that no undetectable
attack can be formulated if the power system is observable
from the protected meter measurements. The early work by
Krumpholz et al. [24] stated that a power system is observ-
able if and only if it contains a spanning tree, which we
refer to as an edged-measured spanning tree, that satisfies
certain measurement-to-transmission-line mapping rules. Few
recent papers also applied graphical methods to study the
attack/defending mechanisms of false-data injection. For in-
stance, based on the results in [24], [25] proposed an algorithm
to quantify the minimum-effort undetectable attack, i.e. the
non-trivial attack that compromises least number of meters
without being detected. Besides, [27] used a min-cut relaxation
method to calculate the security indices defined in [12] to
quantify the resistance of meter measurements in the presence
of injection attack. Similar min-cut approach was also applied
in [13] to identify the critical points in the measurement set,
the loss of which would render the power system unobservable.
In this paper, we also study the state estimation protection
problem from a graphical perspective. The novelties of the
proposed methods are in twofold. First, in addition to the
conventional method of securing meter measurement, we
introduce a new degree of freedom of using CTI for system
protection and derives explicit protection procedures. Second,
we consider a more general problem of protecting any subset
of state variables with minimum cost. The graphical method
of using only CTI for state variable protection is proved to be
equivalent to a well-studied Steiner tree problem. A more chal-
lenging problem is the mixed defending strategy that jointly
considers the CTI and secure meter measurement protection.
We formulate the problem into a variant Steiner arborescence
problem and propose both exact and approximation graphical
algorithms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce some preliminaries about state estimation
and false-data injection attack. We study the design of partial
knowledge attack in Section III. In Section IV, we propose
efficient defending mechanisms and discuss some application
scenarios. The performance of the proposed defending mecha-
nisms is evaluated in Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded
in Section VI. An early version of this paper with only CTI
protection was published in the 2013 IEEE Globecom [28].
II. PRELIMINARY
A. DC measurement model and state estimation
We consider the linearized power network state estimation
problem in a steady-state power system with n+ 1 buses and
3t transmission lines. The topology of the power system can be
characterized by a t×(n+ 1) incidence matrix A in a digraph.
In this paper, we use the terms of buses and vertices, as well
as transmission lines and edges, interchangeably. Let V and E
denote the set of all vertices and edges, respectively. An entry
[A]ij = 1 indicates that edge ei leaves vertex vj , where vj is
referred to as the tail of ei, denoted by e(t)i . [A]ij = −1 if ei
enters vertex vj , where vj is the head of ei, denoted by e(h)i .
The direction from e(t)i to e
(h)
i is the positive direction of ei.
[A]ij = 0 if ei is not incident to vj . Using a 5-bus system in
Fig. 1 for example,
A =


1 −1 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0
0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 1 0 −1
0 0 0 1 −1

 . (1)
The states of the power system include the bus voltage
phase angles and voltage magnitudes. The voltage magnitudes
can often be directly measured, while the values of phase
angles need to be obtained from state estimation [29]. 1
In the linearized (DC) measurement model, we assume the
knowledge of voltage magnitudes (i.e. 1 in the per-unit system)
at all buses and estimate the phase angles based on the active
power measurements, i.e. the active power flows along the
power lines and active power injections at buses [1]. Assume
that a power system is measured by m meters, including mF
flow meters and mI injection meters. The set of all the meters
are denoted by M. Mathematically, the flow and injection
measurements are related to phase angles as(
F
I
)
=
(
LFYA
LIA
⊤YA
)
θv , Hθv, (2)
where H is the measurement Jacobian matrix, θv is the vector
of all the phase angles. Y is a t × t diagonal matrix, where
[Y]ii , yei is the reciprocal of the reactance of power line ei.
LF is a mF ×t matrix, where [LF ]ij = 1 if the ith flow meter
measures the power flow in the positive direction of ej (F+ej ),
−1 if it measures the negative direction (F−ej ) and 0 otherwise.
LI is a mI × (n + 1) matrix with [LI ]ij = 1 indicating that
the ith injection meter measures the power injection at the jth
bus (Ivj ). The superscript (·)⊤ denotes the transpose operation.
Using the power system in Fig. 1 for example,
LF =


1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 1

 ,LI =
(
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
)
.
(3)
Specifically, the rows of LF correspond to flow meters
{r1, r2, r3, r4} and the columns correspond to lines e1 to
e5. The rows of LI correspond to injection meters {r5, r6},
and the rows correspond to buses v1 to v5. Suppose that the
1We also discuss including PMUs, which directly measures voltage phase
angles, in the state estimation protection in Section IV.E.
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Fig. 1. Measurement placement of a 5-bus system with v5 being the
reference.
reactance of all transmission lines equals 1,
H =


1 −1 0 0 0
0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 −1 0 1
0 0 0 1 −1
0 −1 2 0 −1
0 −1 0 2 −1


, (4)
where the first 4 rows represent flow measurements while the
last two rows represent injection measurements.
Based on the above measurement model, we introduce the
following definition 1 on measurability.
Definition 1: (measurability) A flow meter on transmission
line ei (corresponding to F+ei or F−ei ), measures the edge ei,
and the two vertices of ei, i.e. e(h)i and e
(t)
i . An injection
meter on bus vj measures the edges connected to the buses,
i.e.
{
ei | ei ∈ N
+
j ∪ N
−
j
}
, and the vertices of the measured
edges, i.e.
{
e
(h)
i , e
(t)
i | ei ∈ N
+
j ∪ N
−
j
}
, where N+j (N−j ) is
the set of edges that vj being the tail (head).
For instance, the flow meter r4 measures edge e5 and
vertices v4 and v5. The injection meter r5 measures edges e2
and e4 that connects to v3, and vertices v2, v3 and v5. There
could be the case that some components are not measured by
either flow or injection meters, such as edge e4 in Fig. 8. As
we will show in the following section, the state estimation
protection problem is only related to the measured vertices
and edges, thus all the unmeasured elements can be discarded
without affecting the problem solution.
Without loss of generality, we assume that bus n + 1 is
the reference bus, denoted by R, whose phase angle equals
zero. The state estimation problem is therefore to estimate the
other n phase angle state variables, which is captured by the
vector θ = (θ1, θ2, .., θn)
⊤
, based on the m measurements
z = (z1, z2, .., zm)
⊤
, where
z = H¯θ + e. (5)
Here H¯ is the reduced measurement Jacobian matrix excluding
the column that corresponds to the reference bus in H. e ∼
N (0,Q) is independent measurement noise, where Q is the
diagonal covariance matrix. When H¯ is full column rank, i.e.
rank
(
H¯
)
= n, the maximum likelihood estimate θˆ is
θˆ =
(
H¯TQ−1H¯
)−1
H¯TQ−1z , Pz. (6)
In this case, all the state variables have an unique estimate and
the power system is called observable from the measurement
4set M. In this paper, we assume that all the power systems in
consideration are observable from the available measurements.
Equivalently, the observability of a power system can be
characterized in a graph [24].
Proposition 1: The power network G = (V , E) is observ-
able from its measurement set M if and only if the graph
defined on G contains a spanning tree, where each edge of
which is mapped to a meter according to the following rules,
1) an edge is mapped to a flow meter placed on it, if any;
2) an edge without a flow meter is mapped to an injection
meter that measures it;
3) different edges are mapped to different meters in M.
Proof: See [24] for detailed proof. 
A spanning tree that satisfies the conditions in Proposition
1 is referred to as an edge-measured spanning tree (EMST).
An observable power network may contain multiple EMSTs,
which can be easily found using a max-flow method in poly-
nomial time [26]. Using Fig. 1 for example, we can find two
EMSTs with the following edge-to-measurement mappings:
1) {e1, e2, e4, e5} ↔ {r1, r5, r3, r4};
2) {e1, e2, e3, e4} ↔ {r1, r5, r6, r3}.
Essentially, each EMST corresponds to a set of basic mea-
surements, from which the power network is observable. The
properties of EMST are important to derive attacking and
defensive strategies in later sections.
In an observable power network, the estimates θˆ could be
wrong due to random measurement errors or attacks. Some
previous studies detect erroneous estimation by assuming the
prior knowledge of the distribution of state variables, e.g.
the GLRT-based (generalized likelihood ratio test) detector
proposed in [25]. In this paper, we do not assume such
knowledge and adopt the conventional BDD method, which
compares the squared l2-norm of measurement residual with
a threshold τ . The BDD identifies bad data measurements if
r = ||z− H¯θˆ|| = ||
(
I− H¯P
)
e|| > τ. (7)
Otherwise, z is considered as a normal measurement.
B. Undetectable attacks and protection model
Suppose that attackers inject data a = (a1, a2, .., am)⊤ into
measurements. Then, the received measurements become
z˜ = H¯θ + e+ a. (8)
In general, an unstructured a is likely to be identified by the
BDD. However, it is found in [3] that some well-structured
data injections, such as those with a = H¯c, can bypass BDD.
Here c = (c1, c2, .., cn)⊤ is a random vector. This can be
verified by calculating the measurement residual in (8), where
r˜ = ||z˜− H¯Pz˜|| = ||z+ a− H¯(θˆ + c)|| = ||z− H¯θˆ||. (9)
Same residual is obtained as if no malicious data were injected.
Therefore, a structured attack a = H¯c will not be detected by
BDD. We refer to such an injection attack with the residual in
(9) as an undetectable attack. In this case, the system operator
would mistake θˆ + c for a valid estimate, and thus an error
vector c is introduced.
We see that attackers require decent knowledge of H¯
to perform an undetectable attack. Conversely, the system
operator has the potential to eliminate the chance of unde-
tectable attacks by limiting attackers’ knowledge. From (2),
the reduced measurement Jacobian matrix is
H¯ =
(
LFYA¯
LIA
⊤YA¯
)
, (10)
where A¯ is the submatrix of A excluding the column of
the reference bus. From a system operator’s perspective, we
assume a well-informed attacker with the perfect knowledge
of LF , LI and A¯. However, it has imperfect knowledge of Y.
One reason is that the system operator can secretly vary Y by
adjusting the transformer taps installed on the transmission
lines, or using the FACTS to adjust the real-time effective
reactance [20], [21]. We assume the system operator can keep
from attackers the exact reactance of a set of transmission
lines K ⊆ K0, where K0 is the set of lines that the system
operator has the capability to protect. Its objective is to ensure
that no undetectable attack can be formulated to compromise
a given set of state variables D ⊆ I, where I is the set of
all unknown state variables. That is, ci = 0 for all i ∈ D. In
some cases, protecting topological information alone may fail
to achieve the protection objective, e.g. the situation introduced
in Section III.A. In general, a mixed defending strategy is
needed to combine the CTI with secure measurement method.
Then, the question is how to defend D with minimum cost on
line information protection and meter measurement security.
III. OPTIMAL UNDETECTABLE ATTACK WITH PARTIAL
TOPOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
To understand the vulnerability of the power system, we
investigate in this section from the attackers’ perspective the
design of an undetectable attack when full knowledge of
topological information (Y) is not available. In Section III.A,
we first show that undetectable attack can even be performed
without any knowledge of Y when the measurement place-
ment has a special structure, i.e. contains a bridging edge. In
a system free of bridging edges, we show in Section III.B
that undetectable attack is still possible if the attacker has
a structured partial knowledge of Y. Then, we formulate
the optimal attack, which compromises a given set of state
variables with minimum knowledge of network topology,
into a min-cut problem. These results will be used in the
next section to derive defending mechanisms using covert
topological information.
A. Undetectable attack in a system containing bridging edges
For the moment, we assume that no meter is secured by
the system operator. The imperfect knowledge of Y at the
attacker is denoted by Y˜ = Y+ǫ, where ǫ is a diagonal error
matrix unknown to the attackers caused by system operator’s
countermeasures, and ǫel = 0 if the attacker has the perfect
knowledge of line el. Then, the attacker’s knowledge of H¯ is
H˜ , H¯+ δ = H¯+
(
LF ǫA¯
LIA
⊤ǫA¯
)
. (11)
5i
e
j
e
1 2
3 4
Injection meter Flow meter
2 Meter index Reference bus
Fig. 2. An illustration of a bridging edge ei.
If the attacker constructs an injection based on the biased
measurement Jacobian as a = H˜c, the residual norm becomes
r˜ = ||z˜− H¯Pz˜|| = ||
(
I− H¯P
)
δc+
(
I− H¯P
)
e||. (12)
The residual due to attack is
(
I− H¯P
)
δc. Meanwhile, the
estimate of θ is
θ˜ = Pz˜ = θˆ + c+Pδc. (13)
To perform an undetectable attack, we see that δc, or
equivalently the attack vector a, must lie in the null space
of R , I− H¯P. In general, the attacker does not know the
exact Y (and thus exact H¯ and P), therefore cannot obtain a
nontrivial null space of R. However, we show in the following
that simple null space solutions of R can be found without
knowing Y if the measurement placement contains a bridging
edge structure defined as follows.
Definition 2: (bridging edge) In the graph G = (V , E)
defined on a power network, an edge is a bridging edge if
it is contained in all edge-measured spanning trees (EMSTs)
obtained from the power system measurement placement.
For instance, e1 in Fig. 1 is an bridging edge since all
EMSTs must contain e1 to connect v1. In practice, a well-
connected power network with many redundant meter mea-
surements contain only few bridging edges. For example, the
measurement placement of IEEE 14-bus system in Fig. 8 has
only one bridging edge e14. The existence of a bridging edge
indicates poor connectivity from some vertices to the reference
vertex in the EMSTs. To see this, we consider a bridging
edge ei in an EMST in Fig. 2. The two partitions of vertices
connected by ei are denoted by P1 and P2. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the reference vertex is in P1. In
fact, we can infer that all the EMSTs observe the same vertex
partitions P1 and P2. Otherwise, another ej connecting the two
partitions in an EMST would result in a circle. In particular, all
the vertices in P2 will be separated from the reference vertex
if ei is removed in the EMSTs. After taking all the bridging
edges into consideration, we can categorize the vertices into
two non-overlapping types, determined by the connectivity to
the reference vertex as stated in Definition 3.
Definition 3: (vertex type) A vertex is referred to as a P2-
type vertex if it is separated from the reference vertex in any
EMST after all the bridging edges are removed. Otherwise, it
is a P1-type vertex.
For instance, v1 in Fig. 1 and v8 in Fig. 8 are P2-type
vertices, while all the other vertices are P1-type in the respec-
tive cases. Next, we establish in the following Proposition 2
the connection between bridging edge and undetectable attack
without the knowledge of topological information.
Proposition 2: If a measurement placement contains bridg-
ing edge(s), an undetectable attack can be performed to
compromise P2-type vertices without the knowledge of Y.
Sketch of proof: Consider the bridging edge ei in Fig. 2,
which is mapped to either a flow meter (r1 or r2), or an
injection meter at either end of the edge (r3 or r4), following
the definition of an EMST. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume that all the four meters are available in the measurement
set. Then, it can be easily verified that a simple attack vector
a = [1,−1, 1,−1]⊤ to r1 to r4, which injects no data to other
meters, can cause a decrease of 1/yei to all the state variables
in P2 and no impact to the state variables in P1, and the
residual due to attack is zero. This completes the proof. 
Remark 1: Although the attack in Proposition 2 is unde-
tectable, the attacker does not know the exact magnitude of
bias it causes as yei is unknown.
Using Fig. 1 for example, a simple undetectable attack that
increases the reading of meter r1 by 1 unit can compromise
the P2-type vertex v1 without knowing Y. Essentially, this
is because R has special structures to be explored when a
bridging edge exists. Let yei in Fig. 1 be randomly generated
for each line. An example realization of the symmetric matrix
R is
R =


0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.468 0.284 −0.195 0.128 0.337
0 0.284 0.602 0.292 0.271 0.007
0 −0.195 0.292 0.475 0.131 −0.330
0 0.128 0.271 0.131 0.122 0.003
0 0.337 0.007 −0.330 0.003 0.334


.
We notice that all the entries in the first row (column) of
R are always zero regardless of the value of Y. Therefore,
a = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]⊤ satisfies Ra = 0, i.e. zero residual.
In practice, bridging edges, and thus P2-type vertices,
can be easily identified by attackers either by checking the
network topology and measurement placement, or directly
observing the null space of R as Y randomly varies. Then,
following Proposition 2, undetectable attacks can be performed
to compromise P2-type vertices without knowingY. However,
constructing an undetectable attack to compromise the remain-
ing P1-type vertices is much more difficult. Equivalently, the
attack vector can be obtained by constructing an undetectable
attack in a residual power system by removing all the P2-type
vertices. In such a power system free of bridging edges, the
knowledge of Y is critical to construct undetectable attack
vectors, as the null space of R for the residual power system
depends on the value of Y. In this case, the attacking strategy
in Fig. 2 to a non-bridging edge ej becomes detectable.
Intuitively, this is because the state estimates derived from
two different EMSTs can be inconsistent in the presence of
attack, if one tree uses the edge ej mapped to a compromised
meter while the other does not use ej at all.
To study the method to compromise P1-type vertices, we
focus on systems without bridging edges in the remaining part
of this section. In particular, we show that undetectable attacks
is still possible when the attacker has limited but structured
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Fig. 3. Illustration of undetectable attack with partial network information.
partial knowledge of Y. With a bit abuse of notations, we still
use the previously defined variables and parameters, such as
A, H¯ and c, to denote the corresponding items in the residual
power system free of bridging edges, unless stated otherwise.
B. Undetectable attack in a system without bridging edges
In a power system free of bridging edges, we first show that
a necessary and sufficient condition to launch an undetectable
attack is δc = 0 and c 6= 0. For the sufficient argument,
we see from (13) that a nonzero error c is introduced to xˆ if
δc = 0. Besides, the residual in (12) becomes the same as in
(7), as if no malicious data is injected. The necessary argument
is because a nontrivial null space of R cannot be obtained by
attackers without knowing the exact H¯ or P. From (11), the
attacker must ensure the following conditions
LF ǫA¯c = 0, LIA
⊤
ǫA¯c = 0, c 6= 0. (14)
Equivalently, we have
[LF ]il ǫel
[
A¯
]
l∗
c = 0, ∀i, l (15a)
[LI ]ij
L∑
l=1
[A]lj ǫel
[
A¯
]
l∗
c = 0, ∀i, j, (15b)
where
[
A¯
]
l∗
denotes the lth row of matrix A¯.
We illustrate in Fig. 3 a simple case that an undetectable
attack satisfies (15). From (15a), an undetectable attack to
compromise a flow measurement must satisfy
ǫ12 (c1 − c2) = 0. (16)
From (15b), an attack to compromise an injection measure-
ment placed at bus 1 must satisfy
ǫ12 (c1 − c2) + ǫ13 (c1 − c3) + ǫ14 (c1 − c4) = 0. (17)
Since ǫ1i’s are unknown random errors, the attacker must force
each individual term to be 0, i.e.
ǫ1i (c1 − ci) = 0, i = 2, 3, 4. (18)
In other words, (15b) can be decomposed into a number of
flow measurement conditions defined on the transmission lines
measured by the injection meter i, i.e.
[LI ]ij [A]lj ǫel
[
A¯
]
l∗
c = 0, ∀i, j, l. (19)
From (16) and (18), a measured edge [i, j] must satisfy either
ǫij = 0 or ci = cj , or both. Formally, we specify in the
following Theorem 1 the necessary and sufficient condition to
perform an undetectable attack.
Theorem 1: For a power system measurement placement
free of bridging edges, an undetectable attack can be per-
formed if and only if each measured transmission line el, either
by a flow measurement ([LF ]il 6= 0 for some i) or injection
measurement ([LI ]ij [A]lj 6= 0 for some i and j), satisfies at
least one of the following two conditions
1) ǫel = 0, i.e. perfect knowledge of transmission line el,
2) c
e
(h)
l
= c
e
(t)
l
= β. That is, the same error β is introduced
to the head and tail vertices of el, where β is an arbitrary
real number.
We first assume that the attacker intends to compromise
a single state variable θk. That is, ck = 1 and ci = 0,
∀i 6= k. The transmission lines that are not incident to bus vk
automatically satisfy the condition 2), i.e. β = 0. Therefore,
the attacker only needs to obtain the perfect knowledge of the
measured transmission lines that are incident to vk. Now, let
us relax the attacker’s objective to compromise θk regardless
of its influence to the other state variables, i.e. ck = 1 only. In
this case, besides obtaining the knowledge of a transmission
line incident to bus vk, the attacker can also satisfy condition
2) by letting ci = 1 for the bus vi connected to vk. In
fact, the attacker can further introduce errors to the two-hop
neighboring buses until an optimal solution, which requires
the least knowledge of Y, is obtained.
Conceptually, the attacker needs to separate the network
into two disjoint subnetworks, where the same error β = 1
is introduced to the buses in the subnetwork that includes
the tagged bus vk, and β = 0 for the buses in the other
subnetwork. Then, the attacker only needs to obtain the perfect
knowledge of the measured transmission lines that connect
the two subnetworks. It is worth noticing that the tagged
bus vk and the reference bus R cannot be included in the
same subnetwork. Otherwise, the undetectable attack can not
introduce any error to the tagged bus vk because the value
of the reference bus is set to be 0 by default. For instance,
after removing bridging edge e1 and bus v1 in Fig. 1, a cut on
edges e3 and e4 separates the residual power network into two
disjoint subnetworks {v2, v3} and {v4, v5}. Suppose that the
attacker intends to compromise bus v3, which is achievable
by letting c2 = c3 = 1 and c4 = 0. After obtaining the
perfect knowledge of e3 and e4, the attacker needs to inject
to {r2, r3, r4, r5, r6} by a = H˜c = [1, 1, 0, 1,−1], where
c = [c2, c3, c4] is the state vector and H˜ denotes the reduced
measurement Jacobian known by the attacker after removing
e1. As bus v5 is the reference bus, the state estimator in (6)
yields that the error introduced to bus v3 is 1. However, if v2
is the reference bus, such that v3 and the reference are now
included in the same subnetwork, the error introduced to v3
is 0. By definition, the attack to compromise v3 is failed.
In general, the attacker needs to separate the network into a
number of disjoint subnetworks when it intends to compromise
a set of state variables D. Without causing confusions, we use
D to denote the buses of the corresponding state variables. We
denote the vertex sets in the subnetworks by S0, ..,SK , where
R ∈ S0 and D ⊆ S \S0 with S = S0 ∪S1 ∪ ..∪SK being the
set of all vertices. Without loss of generality, an undetectable
attack can be formulated by introducing error βi = i to state
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Fig. 4. Min s-t cut problem with |D| > 1. Here, v1 is the reference bus,
D = {v2, v3, v7} and the shaded vertex denotes the supersink.
variables within Si and obtaining the perfect knowledge of
transmission lines that connect different subnetworks.
C. Optimal attack using min-cut method
An optimal partial knowledge attack, which requires the
minimum cost in acquiring necessary topological information,
can be formulated by solving an s-t min-cut problem.
Definition 4: (Minimum s-t cut problem) An s-t cut C =
(S, T ) in an undirected graph G = (V , E) is a partition of V
such that s ∈ S and t ∈ T , S ∪T = V . The weight of the cut
is the sum of the positive weights of edges between vertices
in each part, where
w(S, T ) =
∑
u∈S,v∈T
wuv. (20)
The minimum s-t cut problem is to determine the cut (S, T )
such that the weight is minimized.
The min s-t cut problem seeks for the optimal cut that
separates the source vertex s and sink vertex t with min-
imum edge cost. It can be efficiently solved using max-
flow approach in polynomial time. The fastest maximum flow
algorithm to solve the min s-t cut problem currently takes
O
(
|E||V| log
(
|V|2/|E|
))
time complexity [13], where |V| and
|E| are the number of vertices and edges in the graph.
The optimal attack formulation can be easily converted into
an s-t min cut problem when |D| = 1, where the reference
bus is set to be the source s and the only target bus is the sink
t. The edge weight wuv represents the difficulty, measured in
dollars, of obtaining the perfect knowledge of a measured line
[u, v], incorporating the factors such as geographical locations
and level of protections, etc. In particular, wuv = ∞ for
those transmission lines whose line reactance is impossible
to obtain, and 0 for publicly accessible information. A slight
modification is needed to solve the problem for |D| > 1. As
illustrated in Fig. 4, this is achieved by adding a supersink
t and connecting all the buses in D to t through edges
with infinite cost. Then, the optimal solution can be obtained
by solving a standard min s-t cut problem that separates
the reference and the supersink. The detailed procedures are
summarized in Algorithm 1. The attacker needs (and only
needs) to inject false data to boundary meters, either flow or
injection, that measure buses at both sides of S and T .
In fact, our results are consistent with [25] that an unde-
tectable attack can be formulated by attacking the boundary
meters in the cut that separates the power network. Here,
instead of assuming the perfect knowledge of H, we further
show that an attack can be performed successfully with lim-
ited topological information. More importantly, the necessary
condition to perform undetectable attack derived in Theorem
1 can be used to devise effective countermeasures against
undetectable attacks, which is detailed in the next section.
Algorithm 1: Minimum-cost partial knowledge attack
input : I,D, R, edge weight vector w.
output: attacking vector a to compromise D
1 Construct a weighted undirected graph G = (V, E) by
removing unmeasured edges and assigning weights to all the
remaining edges;
2 Choose the reference bus as the source s. Add a supersink t,
which connects to all the buses in D with infinite edge weight.
Find the minimum s-t cut, denoted by C = (S ,T );
3 Obtain the exact reactance of the transmission lines in the cut.
That is, ǫij = 0 for i ∈ S and j ∈ T . Introduce the error β to
all the state variables in T , i.e. cj = β for all j ∈ T . Besides,
ci = 0 for all i ∈ S ;
4 Inject attacking vector a = H˜c to boundary measurements.
IV. STATE VARIABLE PROTECTION VIA COVERT
TOPOLOGICAL INFORMATION
In this section, we propose the methods to defend any given
set of state variables against undetectable attacks. Specifically,
we characterize the optimal CTI protection problem as a well-
studied Steiner tree problem. We further propose a mixed
defending strategy that jointly considers the CTI protection
and conventional meter measurement protection methods. Both
exact and approximate algorithms are proposed to obtain a
solution of the mixed defending strategy.
A. Pure CTI protection
We have shown in Section III.A that undetectable attack
can be constructed to compromise P2-type vertices without
knowing Y. It is therefore hopeless to protect P2-type vertices
by keeping transmission line information covert. Alternatively,
P2-type vertices can be protected by conventional secure meter
measurement method. For the moment, we assume the power
system is free of bridging edges, and exploit the solution
structure of using pure CTI to defend against undetectable
attacks. Based on the result, a mixed defending strategy using
both CTI and secure meter measurements is developed in the
next subsection to incorporate the presence of bridging edges.
From Section III.C, to compromise a set of state variables
D, attackers need to obtain the perfect knowledge of a set of
transmission lines, which eventually forms a cut that separates
the buses correspond to D and the reference bus. Conversely,
to prevent any undetectable attack from compromising D, the
system operator needs to maintain “covert” paths linking the
reference bus to all the buses correspond to D. This is formally
proved in the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: In a power system measurement placement
free of bridging edges, no undetectable attack can be formu-
lated to compromise a set of state variables D if and only if
the graph G contains a tree that connects the reference bus
8with all the vertices in D. Each edge of the tree is measured
and its line admittance is covert from the attackers.
Proof: We first show the if part. For each bus vk ∈ D, there
exists a covert path from R to vk, consisting of covert lines.
Without loss of generality, we denote the indices of buses in
the path, from R to the tagged bus vk, by {0, 1, 2, · · · , p}.
Since c0 = 0 (the default value of R), we have c1 = 0. This
is because introducing non-zero error to bus 1 will change
the readings of power flow in edge [0, 1] (the reading could
be of an injection meter), which is not achievable under the
assumption that y01 is not perfectly known to the attacker and
e[0,1] is not a bridging edge. Then, we can argue inductively
that ci = ci−1 for i = 2, · · · , p. Therefore, we have c1 =
· · · = ck = 0. In other words, no error can be introduced to
any bus vk ∈ D.
Then, we prove the only if part. If a vertex in D is not in-
cluded in the tree, attacker can always find a cut that separates
the bus and the reference bus. Thus, an undetectable attack can
be formulated following the steps given in Algorithm 1. 
Theorem 2 indicates that the optimal defending strategy is
equivalent to finding a minimum Steiner tree (MST) which
connects all vertices in D ∪ R with minimum edge weight
sum. The weight of an edge, measured in dollars, is the cost of
protecting the corresponding transmission line information. An
illustrative example is provided in Section V.B and we do not
present here for brevity. A number of exact and approximation
algorithms are available [30]. In particular, polynomial time
exact algorithms are available for some special cases, such
as |D| = 1, 2, |I|. In fact, the algorithms proposed in the
following subsections can also be used to solve the MST
problem. The procedure for optimal CTI protection method
is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Procedure for minimum-cost CTI protection
input : I,D, R, edge weight vector w¯.
output: the set of transmission lines for CTI protection
1 Construct a weighted undirected graph G = (V, E) by
removing unmeasured edges and assigning weights to all the
remaining edges.;
2 Find a minimum Steiner tree T (D) that connects the reference
vertex and all the vertices in D;
3 Keep the line information covert for all edges in T (D).
B. Mixed defending strategy
As mentioned in the last subsection, pure CTI method
cannot protect P2-type vertices from undetectable attacks.
Besides, in practice, not all transmission line information can
be kept covert, such as those without transformer taps, etc.
To tackle these problems, we develop a mixed defending
strategy that allows the system operator to use both CTI
and secure meter measurements to achieve the protection
objective. Specifically, the system operator can select from all
the meters to secure only a subset of them, and from a set of
candidate transmission lines K0 to keep a subset K ⊆ K0 line
information covert.
Our first observation is that, it is useless to keep the line
information of a bridging edge covert. In other words, bridging
edges, if any, must be crossed out from K0. In fact, this is
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Fig. 5. Illustration of virtual power flow meter. The exact reactance of
transmission line e2 can be kept covert from attackers.
consistent with the result in the Steiner tree solution of pure
CTI protection, where K0 is the set of all the measured edges.
A Steiner tree containing a P2-type vertex and the reference
node must contain at least one bridging edge. Therefore, after
the bridging edges are crossed out from K0, there is no way to
construct a Steiner tree solution. In other words, a P2-type ver-
tex cannot be protected using the pure CTI protection method.
Our second observation is that, from attackers’ perspective,
protecting a measured transmission line’s information (a non-
bridging edge of course) is equivalent to securing the line flow
meter placed on it. If line flow meter is absent on the line,
protecting the line information is as if “installing” an extra
secure flow meter on it that measures an arbitrary power flow
direction, referred to as a virtual meter. This is because, when
the reactance of ei is kept covert from attackers, they must
introduce the same error at both ends of ei to avoid triggering
the alarm. The net power flow change in ei must be zero before
and after attack. This is as if a secure flow measurement is
placed on ei, regardless of its physical presence. The idea
of virtual flow meter is illustrated in Fig. 5, where a covert
transmission line e2 is equivalently converted to a virtual meter
measures the power flow on e2. Notice that the virtual meters
are only for the convenience of security analysis but provide
no actual measurement readings.
Suppose that the system operator has the ability to protect
meter measurements M, consisting of both the actual meter
measurements, and those virtual flow meters converted from
the candidate covert transmission lines in K0 free of bridging
edges. The cost of protecting each actual meter measurement
in dollar, e.g. manpower cost or surveillance installation fees,
is given. The cost of a virtual flow meter is the cost of keeping
the corresponding transmission line information covert. When
a virtual flow meter collides with an existing actual flow meter,
we assign the minimum of the costs as the cost to secure the
flow meter. Then, the optimal mixed defending strategy can
be obtained by solving the equivalent secure meter selection
problem in [17], i.e.
minimize
P⊆M
W =
∑
j∈P
wj
subject to rank
(
Hˆ{P},∗
)
= rank
(
Hˆ{P},{I\D}
)
+ |D|,
(21)
where wj is the cost in dollars of securing the meter j. Hˆ is
the new reduced measurement Jacobian matrix incorporating
the virtual flow meters. Hˆ{P},∗ is submatrix of Hˆ consisting
9of the rows associated with the secure meter set P . The
detailed procedure of the mixed defending strategy is given
in Algorithm 3. I
It is proved in [31] that (21) is an NP-hard problem.
However, it only studied a special case with uniform cost
wj = 1 for all the meters. Here, we extend the methods in
[31] to solve the general case with non-uniform costs. In the
following, we first propose a MILP formulation to solve (21),
which significantly reduces the complexity compared with that
of enumeration-based methods by capturing the topological
structure of the optimal solution. Then, we introduce a tree-
pruning heuristic to obtain an approximate solution in poly-
nomial time.
Algorithm 3: Procedure for mixed defending strategy
input : I,D,M, R.
output: a set of meters and transmission lines for mixed
defending strategy
1 Construct an undirected graph G = (V, E) by removing
unmeasured transmission lines. Remove bridging edges in K0;
2 Convert each measured line in K0 into a flow measurement of
arbitrary direction and assign a new weight to the measurement;
3 Solve (21) to obtain the optimal protected meter set P∗ for D;
4 Restore the obtained solution into either covert transmission
lines K or secure meter measurements P .
C. MILP formulation of mixed defending strategy
Recall in Proposition 1 that a power system is observable
if and only if an EMST can be found. The measurements in
an EMST constitute a set of basic measurements, protecting
of which can defend all the state variables from undetectable
attacks [15]. Similarly, it is shown in [31] that no undetectable
attack can be performed to compromise a subset of state
variables D, if an edge-measured Steiner tree can be found
to connect all the vertices in D. In particular, each edge of
the Steiner tree is mapped to a flow or injection meter that
takes its measurement. A subtle difference is that, if an edge
is mapped to an injection meter, all the vertices measured by
the meter must be included in the Steiner tree. In Fig. 1, for
instance, if e4 is selected and mapped to r5, then both v2 and
v5 (vertices measured by r5) must be included in the final
edge-measured Steiner tree solution. If we assign a positive
weight to each edge according to the difficulty of protecting
the corresponding meter it is mapped to, the problem becomes
finding a Steiner tree with the minimum edge weight sum.
Consider a digraph −→G = (V ,A) constructed by replacing each
edge in G = (V , E) with two arcs in opposite directions, where
each arc is assigned the same weight as the original edge.
Finding a minimum edge-measured Steiner tree is equivalent
to the following minimum arc-measured Steiner arborescence
(MASA) problem.
Definition 5: (MASA problem) Given a digraph −→G =
(V ,A), find a Steiner arborescence −→T ∗ = (V∗,A∗) and a
set of meters P∗ ⊆M that satisfy the following conditions
1) V∗ is the set of all vertices measured by P∗;
2) D ⊂ V∗ and R ∈ V∗;
3) each arc in A∗ is one-to-one mapped to a unique meter
in P∗ that takes its measurement,
with the minimum total arc weight
∑
j∈P∗ wj .
Interestingly, the MASA problem has an equivalent network
flow characterization. We set R as the root and allocate one
unit of demand to each vertex in D. Commodities are sent
from the root to the vertices in D through some arcs. Then,
the vertices in D are connected to R via the used arcs if and
only if all the demand is satisfied. When we require delivering
the commodity with minimum cost, the used arcs will form a
directed tree −→T ∗, i.e. a Steiner arborescence. In our problem,
each arc in
−→
T ∗ must be mapped to a unique meter that takes
its measurement. If an arc is mapped to an injection meter, all
the vertices measured by the meter must be included in −→T ∗, as
if an extra demand is allocated at these vertices. To distinguish
from the actual demand at D, we refer to the extra demand
induced by the use of injection meters as pseudo demand.
Then, a MMSA can be found if we can construct a −→T ∗ with
proper measurement mapping and satisfies both the actual and
pseudo demand with minimum cost.
A MILP formulation of the MASA problem is
min
X,Y,Z
∑
(i,j)∈A
w¯ij (xij − zij) +
∑
(i,j)∈A
w¯izij (22a)
s. t. xij ≥
yij
q
, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (22b)
1E(i, j) + zij + zji ≥ xij , ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (22c)∑
(i,j)∈A
zij ≤ 1V (i), ∀i ∈ V (22d)
zij + zji ≤ xij + xji, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (22e)∑
(i,j)∈A
yij −
∑
(j,k)∈A
yjk = d(j), ∀j ∈ V \R (22f)
xij , zij ∈ {0, 1} , yij ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ A. (22g)
Here, xij is a binary variable with xij = 1 indicating that the
arc (i, j) ∈ A is included in −→T ∗ and 0 otherwise. yij denotes
the total amount of commodity through (i, j). zij is a binary
variable with zij = 1 indicating that the injection meter at
vertex i is mapped to arc (i, j) or (j, i), and 0 otherwise. w¯ij
and w¯i are the costs of protecting the flow meter on edge [i, j]
and the injection meter on vertex i, respectively. q is chosen
as a large positive number such that q > yij always holds.
1E(i, j) and 1V (i) are two binary indicator functions, where
1E(i, j) = 1 if a flow meter is available at edge [i, j] and
1V (i) = 1 if an injection meter is available at vi. d(j) is the
demand at vertex j, where
d(j) =
{
1 +
∑
(j,k)∈A zjk +
∑
[k,j]∈E
∑
(k,s)∈A zks j ∈ D∑
(j,k)∈A zjk +
∑
[k,j]∈E
∑
(k,s)∈A zks j /∈ D.
For j /∈ D, d(j) is the total pseudo demand. Otherwise, one
extra unit of actual demand is counted as well.
The two terms in (22a) correspond to the costs on pro-
tecting flow meters and injection meters, respectively. When
w¯ij = w¯i, the objective reduces to min∑(i,j)∈A xij , i.e.
finding a Steiner arborescence with the minimum number
of arcs as in [31]. Constraint (22b) forces arc (i, j) to be
included in −→T ∗ if any commodity flow passes through (i, j).
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Constraint (22c) and (22d) ensure that each arc (i, j) included
in −→T ∗ has at least one measurement assigned to it and each
injection measurement can only be assigned to at most one arc.
Constraint (22e) eliminates the possibility that two injection
meters at vi and vj are mapped to the same arc (i, j). The flow
conservative constraint (22f), together with (22b), forces the
selected arcs to form an arborescence rooted at the reference
vertex and spanning all vertices with positive demand. Once
the optimal solution to (22) is obtained, we can restore the
optimal solution to the mixed defending strategy by protecting
1) injection meter on bus i if zij = 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ A;
2) the transmission line information or the actual flow
meter that corresponds to the flow measurement on arc
(i, j), if xij = 1 and zij = zji = 0, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A. That
is, the arcs in −→T ∗ not mapped to any injection meters.
Notice that the above MILP formulation can also be used to
solve the MST problem in Algorithm 2 by setting zij = 0.
D. Tree pruning heuristic
Experimental results show that the MILP formulation in
(22) largely reduces the computational complexity compared
with enumeration-based algorithms. However, solving a MILP
is still NP-hard, which may incur high computational com-
plexity in large-scale power networks. To tackle the intractabil-
ity of the problem, we introduce a tree pruning heuristic (TPH)
that obtains an approximate solution in polynomial time.
The key observation is that, although it is generally hard
to find a minimum arc-measured Steiner arborescence which
connects a subset of vertices in the graph, it is relatively
easy to find an arc-measured spanning arborescence that
spans all the vertices. This can be achieved using the tree
construction techniques proposed in [24] or [26]. Starting
from an arborescence that spans all vertices in the full graph,
our TPH method iteratively prunes away redundant vertices
and updates the arborescence, until a shortest possible arc-
measured arborescence (in the sense of total arc weight) is
obtained. A pseudo-code is provided in Algorithm 4. The
TPH consists of multiple iterations of pruning operations. Each
iteration consists of 3 major steps:
1) Arc-measured spanning arborescence generation (line
3− 4). We generate K arc-measured spanning arbores-
cences from the given vertices V¯ used for later pruning
operation.
2) Vertex identification and tree pruning (line 5−7). In each
of the K arborescences, we first identify the sets of child
vertices C (i) and descendant vertices D(i) for each
vertex vi. In particular, vj ∈ C (i) if there is an arc (i, j)
and vj ∈ D(i) if there exists a path from vi to vj . In Fig.
6, for instance, v6 and v7 are the child vertices of v4,
while v6 to v13 are all descendent vertices of v4. Starting
from the root, we then find the largest prunable subset
C∗s (i) for each vi in the arborescence. That is, the largest
set of vertices in the descendent set of vi, the pruning
of which would still produce a residual arborescence as
a feasible solution to the MASA problem.
3) Vertex update (line 8). We update V¯ from the best resid-
ual arborescence with the minimum arc-weight sum.
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Fig. 6. An arc-measured arborescence. {v1, v5, v8} are the terminals and
v1 is the reference. Two marked edges ([4, 6] and [9, 11]) are mapped to
injection meters and the other unmarked edges are mapped to flow meters.
The iteration continues until the arc weight of the best
arborescence cannot be further reduced (line 9). Then, the
optimal mixed defending strategy can be easily obtained by
protecting the injection meters in P∗ and the flow meter (or the
transmission line information) that corresponds to each flow
meter in P∗. The TPH method in this paper is a generalization
of the pruning method in [31], which considers all arcs with
an equal weight. Due to the page limit, we refer interested
readers to [31] for detailed tree pruning techniques. Instead, we
provide an example in Fig. 6 to illustrate its basic operations.
We consider an arc-measured arborescence with 12 vertices.
Starting from the root v1, among the three child vertices of
v1, only v2 can be pruned, since the descendent vertices of
either v3 or v4 contain terminal vertex. After pruning v2, we
proceed to check v3, whose only child vertex v5 is a terminal.
Then, we check v4, where neither of its child vertices v6 and
v7 can be pruned separately or together. On one hand, this is
because v6 contains terminal as its descendent vertices. On the
other hand, the removal of v7 does not remove the arc (4, 6),
which is mapped to the injection meter at v6 that measures
v7. For v7, however, all of its descendent vertices can be
pruned following the two pruning conditions. Up to now, we
have finished the first iteration of pruning. Then, we use the
remaining vertices {v1, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8} to generate new
arborescences, if any, and repeat the pruning iterations.
The purpose of introducing the parameter K is because
the final output P∗ is closely related to the arborescence’s
topology obtained in Step 1. Intuitively, with larger K , we
have a larger chance to obtain an arc-measured arborescence
with lower arc weight but also consume more computations.
The proper choice of K will be discussed in Simulations.
The correctness of TPH is obvious from the following facts:
1) the K residual arborescences are always feasible to the
MASA problem; 2) the arc weight of the minimum residual
arborescence is non-increasing during the iterations. There are
at most |I|−|D| rounds of pruning. In each round, K arbores-
cences are pruned and each takes O
(
|I|3
)
time complexity,
dominated by the Gauss-Jordan elimination computation. The
overall time complexity is O
(
K|I|4
)
, which is considered
efficient even for very large scale power systems.
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Algorithm 4: Tree pruning heuristic algorithm
input : G¯ (M) = (V, E), D, R, K
output: Minimum protected measurements P∗ to defend D
1 initialization: V¯ = V , T ∗ = ∅, W ∗ =∞;
2 repeat
3 Record T−1 = T ∗ and W−1 = W ∗;
4 Find K basic measurement sets of V¯ , denoted by P¯k,
k = 1, .., K. For each P¯k, construct a feasible
arc-measured spanning arborescences Tk. Let
W0 = min
k=1,...,K
∑
j∈P¯k
wj ;
5 for each Tk do
6 Starting from R to all leaf vertices, find the largest
prunable subset C∗s (i) for each vi. Update Tk =
Tk \ {C
∗
s (i) ∪D(C
∗
s (i))} until each vertex in Tk is
either processed or pruned;
7 end
8 Select the trees T ∗ with the minimum arc weight W ∗ and
update V¯ ← the vertices in T ∗;
9 until W ∗ ≥ min (W0,W−1);
10 if W−1 < W0 then
11 P∗ ← the remaining measurements corresponding to T−1;
12 else
13 P∗ ← the remaining measurements corresponding to T ∗;
14 end
E. Discussion of application scenarios
The proposed defending mechanisms are designed to be ap-
plied to linearized DC power flow model. Essentially, however,
the proposed mixed defending strategy is derived based on
the general notion of topological observability proposed in
[24], which states that the observability of a power network,
i.e. whether a unique estimate of all state variables can
be derived from the meter measurements, is equivalent to
whether it contains an arc-measured spanning arborescence
that spans all the vertices in the graph. In this paper, we indeed
generalize the conventional concept of network observability
to state variable observability. That is, a unique estimate of a
subset of state variables can be obtained from a subset of
meter measurements. Similar to the arc-measured spanning
arborescence structure for network observability, we propose
an equivalent MASA structure for state variable observability,
where a MASA connects the vertices of critical state variables
to the reference bus. Based on the arborescence structure, we
show that protecting a set of transmission line information and
a set of meter measurements will render the attackers’ effort to
find a cut-set to compromise critical state variables impossible.
Since the topological observability does not depend on power
system line electrical parameters or operating points [4], our
results based on topological observability can also be applied
to defend state estimation that uses nonlinear AC power flow
models. Due to the scope of this paper, we do not extend the
discussion and treat the detailed analysis in AC state estimation
protection as a future working direction.
Another interesting application scenario is to include phasor
measurement units (PMUs) into the measurement set besides
the power flow and injection measurements. Combined with
GPS technology, PMUs can provide direct real-time voltage
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Fig. 7. Integration of PMUs in state estimation protection.
phasor measurement, i.e. voltage amplitude and phase angle, 2
with high precision and short measurement periodic time [32].
Interestingly, our method can be easily extended to incorporate
PMUs in the measurement set. Note that the state variable of
a tagged bus cannot be compromised by attacks if a secure
PMU is installed at the bus.3 This is equivalent to installing
a secure flow meter between the tagged bus and the reference
bus. If there is a collide with existing flow meter, we merely
change the cost of protecting the meter by the minimum cost
between the existing flow meter and the PMU. On the other
hand, if there exists no such power line connecting the two
buses, a pseudo transmission line can be added to facilitate the
calculation of the MASA problem. An illustrative example
is given in Fig. 7, where a graph is extracted from a 7-
bus power network. Bus 1 is the reference bus and PMUs
are available at bus 1 and 5. The solid edges are the actual
transmission lines in the power network. The dashed edge
connecting bus 1 and 5 is made up by the PMU at bus 5, where
a pseudo-flow meter of random direction is placed on edge
e[1,5]. Since now we have formulated an equivalent problem
with conventional power flows/injections measurements, the
proposed arborescence construction algorithms can be directly
applied. The only modification needed is that injection meters
cannot be mapped to a dashed edge in the Steiner tree
solution, because they do not measure the dashed edges in
real system. The detailed modifications are omitted here to
avoid the repetition of presentations. In the example in Fig.
7, an arc-measured arborescence can be constructed by edges{
e[1,5], e[5,7]
}
, which are mapped to the pseudo-flow meter on
edge e[1,5] (from the PMU at bus 5) and the flow meter on
edge e[5,7], respectively. Then, state variable of bus 7 can be
defended if the PMU at bus 5 and the flow meter on e[5,7] are
protected.
Before leaving this session, we want to specify the best
use of the proposed algorithms. When protecting all the state
variables, the state estimation protection problem in [15] is a
special case of ours. The proposed TPH algorithm indeed uses
the same Gauss-Jordan elimination technique proposed in [15].
2There also exists other type of PMUs that can also provide current phasors
of all the incident branches. We do not include them into consideration in this
paper because they are inconsistent with our notion of a “measurement”, which
provides only one reading at a time. However, we may study this problem in
our future work.
3PMU is normally required to be installed at the reference bus to avoid the
confusions due to the absolute voltage phasor measurements.
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TABLE I
STATISTICS OF DIFFERENT POWER SYSTEM TESTCASES
No. of buses 14-bus 57-bus 118-bus
No. of lines 20 80 186
Total no. of measurements 20 80 180
No. of inject measurements 8 30 70
No. of flow measurements 12 50 110
No. of unmeasured lines 1 2 7
For the proposed MILP formulation, however, the complexity
could be much higher due to the NP-harness of solving integer
programming problems. Therefore, we do not recommend to
using MILP to solve the special case that all the state variables
are to be protected. Another point to mention is the impact of
the redundancy in measurements. On one hand, the complexity
of the MILP increases with the measurement redundancy, as
the number of variables zij in the optimization problem (22)
will increase. On the other hand, the proposed TPH is not
sensitive to measurement redundancy, i.e. its complexity is
O(K|I|4), independent of the number of measurements.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the proposed
attacking/defending mechanisms. All the computations are
solved in MATLAB on a computer with an Intel Core2
Duo 3.00-GHz CPU and 4 GB of memory. In particular,
MatlabBGL package is used to solve some of the graphical
problems [33], such as maximum-flow/min-cut calculation,
etc. Besides, Gurobi is used to solve MILP problems [34].
The power systems we considered are IEEE 14-bus, 57-bus
and 118-bus testcases, whose topologies are obtained from
MATPOWER [35] and summarized in Table I. For illustration
purpose, a measurements placement of the 14-bus system is
plotted in Fig. 8. The measurement placements for 57-bus and
118-bus systems are omitted for the simplicity of expositions.
A. Min-cut partial knowledge attack
In Fig. 8, we first illustrate the min-cut mechanism to
formulate the optimal partial knowledge attack in the 14-
bus testcase, where the critical state variables to be protected
are D = {v10, v12} and v1 is the reference. Without loss of
generality, we assume that it takes the attacker 2 dollars to
obtain the exact reactance of lines e1 to e9, while 1 dollar for
lines e10 to e20. Following Algorithm 1, a partial knowledge
attack via min-cut calculation to compromise D is illustrated
in Fig. 8. The edges on the optimal cut are {e10, e16, e17}
and the minimum cost is 3 dollars. Evidently, the optimal cut
separates D from the reference bus v1. Then, the attackers
need to obtain the perfect knowledge of {ye10 , ye16 , ye17} and
inject adequate false data to meters {r6, r9, r15, r16, r18} that
measure the edges in the cut. For instance, false data c10ye16
is injected to flow meter r9 if the attackers intend to cause a
bias c10 to the estimate of v10. The detailed injections to the
other meters are omitted due to page limit. It can be easily
verified using the residual test in (7) that such an attack is
undetectable.
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Fig. 9. The tree structure illustration of CTI protection method (K0 = E).
B. Case study of CTI protection
To better visualize the proposed CTI defending mechanisms,
we present a case study for the 14-bus system. The state
variables to be protected are D = {v10, v12}. Following
Algorithm 2, we plot in Fig. 9 the Steiner tree solution of pure
CTI protection, assuming that all the measured edges can be
protected, i.e. K0 = E , and each costs 1 dollar. We see that
at least 5 transmission lines should be kept from attackers.
When only partial line information can be protected, e.g.
K0 = {e2, e7, e9, e16}, the CTI protection method would fail
to defend D due to the insufficient resource needed for system
security. In this case, we use the mixed defending strategy,
where the cost of protecting each measurement is also assumed
to be 1 dollar. Following Algorithm 3 (using the MILP
formulation), the optimal defending strategy is illustrated in
Fig. 10, where K∗ = {e2} and P∗ = {r6, r7, r10, r16, r19} and
has a total cost of 6 dollars. In practice, the cost of protecting
line information can be much smaller than physically securing
a meter measurement. Without loss of generality, we change
the cost of protecting each line to 0.1 dollar. As illustrated in
Fig. 11, the optimal mixed defending strategy now becomes:
K∗ = {e2, e7, e9, e16} and P∗ = {r6, r11, r19}, with a total
cost 3.4 dollars.
C. Efficiency of the MILP formulation
We proceed to evaluate the computational complexity of the
proposed MILP formulation. Extensive simulations show that
the proposed MILP always obtain the optimal solution. Here,
we use enumeration based (ENUM) exhaustive searching
algorithm as the performance benchmark. For simplicity, we
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Fig. 10. The tree structure of mixed defending strategy (K0 =
{e2, e7, e9, e16}). The cost of protecting each transmission line is 1 dollar.
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Fig. 11. The tree structure of mixed defending strategy (K0 =
{e2, e7, e9, e16}). The cost of protecting each transmission line is 0.1 dollar.
assume that wi = 1 in (21) for each meter i. For MILP,
we record the number of simplex iterations performed by the
branch-and-cut algorithm (IM ). For the ENUM algorithm, we
record the number of enumerations taken to obtain the optimal
solution (IE). Both numbers are the iterations consumed by
the two methods to obtain a solution. Besides, we also record
the CPU time of both MILP and ENUM algorithms, denoted
by TM and TE , respectively. The results in Table II are the
average performance of 50 independent experiments in 14-
bus, 57-bus and 118-bus systems. Without loss of generality,
we randomly generate a D with size |D| = 4 in each
experiment. We notice that both methods consume very similar
CPU time to obtain an optimal solution in the 14-bus system.
However, the disparity becomes more and more significant as
the network size increases. For instance, the MILP consumes
0.23 seconds to obtain an optimal solution in the 57-bus
system, while the ENUM algorithm may take decades. For
118-bus system, the CPU time of the ENUM algorithm can be
practically considered as infinite, while the MILP formulation
can solve the problem in around a minute. Similar results
are also observed for the iteration numbers, i.e. IM and IE ,
where ENUM becomes computationally infeasible even under
moderate network size. The MILP methods largely reduces
the complexity by exploiting the topological structure of the
optimal solution. However, due to the NP-harness of problem
(21), we still observe the fast growing complexity of MILP as
the network size increases. For instance, the projected CPU
time of MILP in a 300-bus system is around 2 days.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF MILP WITH ENUMERATION BASED ALGORITHM
TM TE IM IE
14-bus 0.041 s 0.042 s 69.3 250.0
57-bus 0.23 s projected 90 years 1354 6.79 · 1012
118-bus 64.6 s ∞ 874000 1.26 · 1021
D. Performance of the tree pruning heuristic
We then evaluate the performance of the proposed TPH
algorithm in both complexity and solution quality. The 14-bus,
57-bus and 118-bus systems are considered and MILP is the
benchmark for comparison. In each system, we assume that
20% of the transmission lines can be chosen as the candidate
covert transmission lines for protection. For instance, we
consider 16 out of 80 transmission lines as K0 in the 57-bus
system. The cost of protecting each transmission line is 0.1,
while 1 for securing a meter measurement. For TPH, we set
the parameter K = 1 and record the total number of vertices
that are checked to produce a solution. For MILP, we record
the number of simplex iterations performed by the branch-
and-cut algorithm. Besides, we also record the CPU time for
both methods.
Fig. 12 compares the computational complexity between
MILP and TPH algorithms. The results in Fig. 12 are the
average performance of 50 independent experiments. Without
loss of generality, we randomly generate a D with size |D| = 4
in each experiment. In Fig. 12a, we show the average number
of iterations in log-scale for 14-bus, 57-bus and 118-bus
systems, respectively. The exact iteration numbers are also
marked in the figure. We find that the iteration numbers are
close for both methods in the 14-bus system, where TPH
consumes 34 iterations and the MILP consumes 79 iterations
to obtain a solution. However, the difference becomes more
and more significant as the network size increases. The number
of iterations of TPH increases by 12 times as the network
size increases from 14 to 118 buses. In vivid contrast, the
iteration number of MILP increases rapidly by 16713 times,
from merely 79 to 1320300. Similar results are also observed
for the CPU time, where TPH takes only 0.496 second to
obtain a solution in 118-bus system, while MILP consumes
more than a minute, which is 421 times slower than in the 14-
bus system. It is foreseeable that the computational complexity
of the MILP method will become extremely expensive as we
further increase the network size. For instance, the projected
CPU time of MILP to solve a problem in 300-bus system is
around 2 days, while it takes TPH less than 2 seconds.
We also investigate the impact of the parameter K to the
performance of TPH. By varying the values of K and |D|,
we plot the ratio W/W ∗ for some selected |D|’s in Fig. 13a,
where W is the cost of the solution obtained by TPH and
W ∗ is the minimum cost obtained from MILP. We notice that
the ratio improves notably for small |D| as K increases from
1 to 15. For instance, the ratio improves from 1.70 to 1.05
for |D| = 1. The improvement is especially notable when
we change K = 1 to 3. However, the improvement becomes
marginal as we further increase K , such as the case with |D| =
49, where the ratio only improves by 0.09 from K = 1 to 15.
We also plot in Fig. 13b the CPU time normalized against the
14
Fig. 12. Comparison of computational complexity for MILP and TPH. (a)
The figure above shows the average number of iterations to obtain a solution;
(b) the figure below shows the average CPU time to obtain a solution.
Fig. 13. Effect of K to the performance of TPH in the 57-bus system. (a)
The figure above shows the cost of solution using TPH normalized by the
optimal cost obtained by MILP; (b) the figure below shows the CPU time of
TPH normalized by the CPU time when K = 1.
time consumed when K = 1. We observe that the CPU time
increases almost linearly with K , which matches our analysis
in Section IV. Results in Fig. 13 indicate that we should select
a proper K to achieve a balance between the solution quality
and computational complexity. In particular, a large K , such
as K = 10, should be used when |D| is small relative to n,
i.e. |D| < 0.1n. Otherwise, a small K , such as K = 3, should
be used when |D| is relatively large.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the defending mechanisms
against false-data injection attack using covert topological
information (CTI). We studied from both the attackers’ and
the system operator’s perspective and characterized the optimal
protection as a well-studied Steiner tree problem in a graph.
We also proposed a mixed defending strategy that bridges
the gap between CTI protection and the conventional wisdom
of secure meter measurement protection method. Both exact
solution and reduced complexity approximate algorithms are
proposed. The advantageous performance of the proposed
defending mechanisms are evaluated in IEEE standard power
system testcases.
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